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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In Estin v. Estin 22 the wife had obtained a support order in New
York prior to her husband's Nevada ex parte divorce. In a later suit
by the wife for arrears in alimony in New York, the court said
"... the fact that marital capacity was changed does not mean that
every other legal incidence of the marriage was necessarily affected." 23
In Armstrong v. Armstrong,24 an Ohio court awarding the wife ali-
mony was held to have afforded full faith and credit to a Florida
ex parte divorce decree which recited "'that no award of alimony be
made.' "25 The Court held that ".... the Florida court did not pur-
port to adjudicate the absent wife's right to alimony." 26 The con-
curring opinion of Justice Black refused to side-step the constitutional
question. The decree " '. . . specifically decreed that no award of
alimony be made to the defendant ... .' "2 7 Relying on the Estin
case Justice Black continued that because ".... Mrs. Estin's claim to
support had been reduced to judgment . . . is not a meaningful dis-
tinction. Mrs. Armstrong's right to support before judgment, like
Mrs. Estin's after judgment, is the kind of personal right which can-
not be adjudicated without personal service." 28
Relying on the dicta in the Estin and Armstrong cases, the ma-
jority in the instant case found that there was no. conflict between
their decision and the full faith and credit clause. In effect, the Court
says that marriage as well as divorce could be called "divisible."
Marriage is thus two separate things-marital status and its legal
incidents.2 9 It presents an interesting picture. A wife can be de-
prived of marital status by mere constructive service; but she can-
not be deprived of support by a foreign court lacking in personam
jurisdiction.
Lis PENDENS - CANCELLATION FOR FAILURE TO COMMENCE
ACTION ENDS PRIVILEGE.-Plaintiff filed in County Court a summons,
complaint and a notice of pendency of action involving an alleged con-
tract to sell real property, but failed to serve the defendant. Before
cancellation of this notice became effective, plaintiff filed a second
lis pendens in Supreme Court in the same cause and served the de-
fendant. The defendant moved to cancel the new lis pendens. The
22334 U.S. 541 (1948).
23 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948).
24350 U.S. 568 (1956).
25 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 571 (1956).2 6 Id. at 569.27 Id. at 575.
28 Id. at 577.
29 See Bingham, The American Law Institute vs. the Supreme Court: In the
Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 393, 401 (1936).
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Court of Appeals held that where a party seeking the privilege of lis
pendens fails to comply strictly with its requirements, he forfeits the
privilege for that cause of action. Israelson v. Bradley, 308 N.Y. 511,
127 N.E.2d 313 (1955).
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded on the theory of public
policy rather than notice.' It developed from the early Roman law
principle,2 pendente lite nihil innovetur: during the pendency of an
action nothing should be changed.3 The English courts adopted the
doctrine both at common law and equity,4 declaring that one who pur-
chased real property during the pendency of a suit was bound by the
decree.5 Later it became statutory.8
Nev York courts early approved of and adopted the doctrine. 7
In 1823 the state legislature modified the case law by passing a statute
requiring that, if notice is to be given to third parties, a lis pendens be
filed in various real property actions.8 Today, Sections 120 to 125 of
the New York Civil Practice Act provide for the filing, cancellation,
recording and effect of a lis pendens. Section 120 allows a plaintiff
to file a notice before service of the summons "but . . . personal or
substituted service... must be made . . . within sixty days after the
filing ... or publication . . . be commenced, or service . . . be made
without the state, as prescribed by law." 9 Section 123 states that
". .. if a plaintiff filing the notice unreasonably neglects to proceed
in the action, the court, in its discretion . . . may direct that a notice
... be cancelled .... " 10 In applying these statutes the courts have
held the provisions of Section 120 to be mandatory and peremptory,"
and have cancelled the notice where the plaintiff failed to serve the
defendant within sixty days.1 2  The courts first acted under the
' See Lamont v. Cheshire, 65 N.Y. 30, 36 (1875); Bellamy v. Sabine,
1 DeG. & J. 566, 578, 44 Eng. Rep. 842, 847 (Ch. 1857).2 Jones v. Williams, 155 N.C. 179, 71 S.E. 222, 224 (1911) (dictum);
Note, 12 Omn. L. REv. 68 (1932).
3 BALLRNTINE, LAw DICTIONARY 948 (2d ed. 1948).
4 See Bishop of Winchester v. Paine, 11 Ves. Jun. 196, 197, 32 Eng. Rep.
1062, 1063 (Ch. 1805); 3 WAuEN's WEED, Nav YORK REAL PRoPERTY 304(4th ed. 1950) ; 8 CARMODY, NEW YoRK PRAcricE 23 (2d ed. 1933).
Bishop of Winchester v. Paine, supra note 4; Bellamy v. Sabine, supra
note 1, at 584, 44 Eng. Rep. at 849 (dictum).
62 & 3 Vicr., c. 11, §7 (1839).
7 See Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. *566 (1815); 3 WAuN, op. cit.
supra note 4.8 Laws of N.Y. 1823, c. 182.
9 N.Y. Civ. PmAc. Acr § 120.1o N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 123.
12 See Brown v. Mando, 125 App. Div. 380, 109 N.Y. Supp. 726 (1st Dep't
1908); Singer v. Regal Shoulder Pad Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y. City Ct.
1948) ; PRAsnicER, NEW YORK PRAcrcEz 603 n.13 (3d ed. 1954).
12 See Napoli v. Frank, 202 App. Div. 482, 195 N.Y. Supp. 108 (1st Dep't
1922); Brown~ v. Mando, supra note 11; Cohen v. Biber, 123 App. Div. 528,
108 N.Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dep't 1908); Lipschitz v. Watson, 113 App. Div. 408,
99 N.Y. Supp. 418 (2d Dep't 1906) (per curiam); Cohen v. Ratkowsky, 43
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"unreasonable neglect to proceed" provision of Section 123 "3 but one
court later denied its applicability.14 The courts have also cancelled
the lis pendens where one of several defendants was not served within
sixty days although his co:-defendants were.1 5  However, where the
defendant has evaded service for the sixty days, the court has refused
to cancel the lis pendens.16 Until the sixty-day period has expired,
the court cannot cancel the lis pendens.' 7
The Court of Appeals in the instant case considered for the first
time the question of cancellation of notice for failure to commence an
action.' 8 After examining Sections 120 and 123 the Court determined
that neither apply to the facts of the case. Both sections deal with
actions only and the Court pointed out that an action, as defined in
Section 218 of the New York Civil Practice Act, was not involved.'
9
Hence. the Court concludes that the legislature has left to the courts
the power to decide the question.
In deciding the case the Court followed the decisional law estab-
lished by lower courts in cases such as Cohen v. Ratkowsky 20 and
Cohen v. Biber.2 1 Plaintiffs in both cases filed lis pendens, but did
not serve the defendants within sixty days. In the Ratkowsky case,
after the first notice was cancelled, the court cancelled a second lis
pendens filed in the same action, holding that the cancellation of the
first notice bad decided the issue.22 In the Biber case the. court can-
celled a lis pendens on the grounds that the plaintiff, accepting a
privilege, had violated its terms and thus lost the privilege.. The
Court, in the instant case, directly adopts the reasoning of the Biber
case. It declares the filing of. a lis pendens to be "an extraordinary
App. Div. 196, 59 N.Y. Supp. 344 (1st Dep't 1899) ; Singer v. Regal Shoulder
Pad Co., supra note 11; Lipschutz v. Horton, 55 Misc. 44, 104 N.Y. Supp. 850
(Sup. Ct. 1907). But see Bruno v. Bruno, 81 N.Y.S2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
13 See Napoli v. Frank, supra note 12; Brown v. Mando,. supra note 11;
Cohen v. Ratkowsky, supra note 12, at 198, 59 N.Y. Supp. at 345.
14 See 17th Ave. & 73rd Street Corp. v. Ocean Operating Corp, 215 App.
Div. 106, 213 N;Y. Supp. 608 (?d Dep't 1926).
15 See Steinmetz v. Kindred, 121 App. Div. 260, 105 N.Y. Supp. 676 (2d
Dep't 1907); Nassau Suffolk Lumber and Supply Corp. v.' Peterson, 133
N.Y.S2d 590 (Sup. Ct 1954). But see Hudson River Yards Corp. v. Morano
Construction Corp., 284 App. Div. 894 (2d Dep't 1954) (without opinion).
16 See Levy v. Kon, 114 App. Div. 795, 100 N.Y. Supp. 205 (2d Dep't
1906) ; Shostack v. Haskell, 116 Misc. 475, 190 N.Y. Supp. 174 (Sup. Ct. 1921),
aff'd without opinion, 200 App. Div. 919, 192 N.Y. Supp. 950 (2d Dep't 1922).
17 17th Ave. & 73rd Street Corp. v. Ocean Operating Corp., supra note 14.
18 See Israelson v. Bradley, 308 N.Y. 511, 516, 127 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1955).
19 Section 218 reads in part, "A civil action is commenced by the service of
a summons, which is a mandate of the court" N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. Acr § 218.
20 43 App. Div. 196, 59 N.Y. Supp. 344 (1st Dep't 1899).
21123 App. Div. 528, 108 N.Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dep't 1908).
22 "The order was the law of the case, and so long as it remained in force
the plaintiff could not file another notice. If the plaintiff was not satisfied he
should have appealed from the order." Cohen v. Ratkowsky, 43 App. Div.
196, 198, 59 N.Y. Supp. 344, 345 (1st Dep't- 1899).
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privilege" 2 granted by the legislature. To reap the benefits of this
privilege, the plaintiff must comply strictly with its requirements.
"If the terms imposed are not met, the privilege is at ari end." 24 The
Court also, on the facts, extends the decision of the Riatkowsky case.
Where, in that case, the court cancelled a second notice in the same
action,-here the Court has said that a second notice may not be filed
where the plaintiff abandons all prior proceedings and -begins anew in
a different court.
This result, however, would seem to be necessary, since,, without
.it, the law as expressed in the Ratkowsky case.-.puld.be easily cir-
cumvented. Although the plaintiff in this case-,.apareptly failed to
make service solely through his own neglect, the penalty seems harsh.
Justice might better be served by amending th lis pendens statutes
to require filing of a bond, similar in purpose and effect to the bond
necessary for issuance of warrants of attachment.25 Then the.plaintiff
would be penalized for his neglect by forfeiture, of the bond but would
not lose the privilege of filing a lis pendens.
S ECiAL LEGISLATION - OPTIoNAL AmENDMENT TO UNIFORM
UP-S rATE JuRy LAw UP uELD.-Plaintiff brought a tax-payer's suit
to restrain defendant-officers of Albany County from applying the
jrovisions of the so-called 1954 "Uniform Up-State .Juiy. Law," as
amended in 1955.1 The amendment nide the uniform regulations of
the 1954 statute optional with counties of less than 100,000 population.
The plaintiff contended that the statute, as amended, violates New
York constitutional provisions which (1) forbid local or private laws
in establishing juries 2 and (2) restrict them when related to county
23 Israelson v. Bradley, 308 N.Y. 511, 516, 127 N.E2d 313, 315 (1955).
24 Ibid.25 Section 819 of the New York Civil Practice Act provides in part that
"Except where security is expressly dispensed with by statute, such an order
or warrant shall not be granted unless the party applying therefor gives se-
curity for the protection of the party against whom or whose property the order
or warrant is to be directed." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 819.
Section 907 provides in part that "The undertaking to be given on the part
of the plaintiff, before the granting of the warrant [of attachment], shall be
to the effect that if the defendant recovers judgment, or if the warrant- is
vacated, the plaintiff will pay all costs which may be awarded to the defendant
and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, not ex-
ceeding the sum specified in the undertaking." Id. § 907.
1N.Y. JuD. LAw §§ 650-85 (Supp. 1955), as amended, N.Y. JuD. LAw§§ 500-31 (Supp. 1956).2
"The legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any of the follow-ing cases:
"Selecting, drawing, summoning or empaneling grand or petit jurors."
N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, § 17.
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